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Abstract—A fundamental component of the game theoretic
approach to distributed control is the design of local utility
functions. In Part I of this work we showed how to systematically
design local utilities so as to maximize the induced worst case
performance. The purpose of the present manuscript is to special-
ize the general results obtained in Part I to a class of monotone
submodular, supermodular and set covering problems. In the case
of set covering problems, we show how any distributed algorithm
capable of computing a Nash equilibrium inherits a performance
certificate matching the well known 1 − 1/e approximation of
[1]. Relative to the class of submodular maximization problems
considered here, we show how the performance offered by the
game theoretic approach improves on existing approximation
algorithms. We briefly discuss the algorithmic complexity of
computing (pure) Nash equilibria and show how our approach
generalizes and subsumes previously fragmented results in the
area of optimal utility design. Two applications and corre-
sponding numerics are presented: the vehicle target assignment
problem and a coverage problem arising in distributed caching
for wireless networks.
Index Terms– Game theory, distributed optimization, resource
allocation, combinatorial optimization, price of anarchy.
I. INTRODUCTION
THERE has been a growing interest in recent years inthe analysis and control of multi agent and networked
systems. The potential of such systems stems from the societal
impact that they promise to deliver: from medicine [2] to
surveillance [3], from future mobility [4] to food production
[5], to name a few. The typical challenge in the control
of such systems is the design of agent-level decision rules
that are capable of achieving a desirable joint objective by
relying solely on local information. A recent approach based
on game theoretic arguments and termed game design [6] has
proved useful in complementing the results obtained by more
traditional techniques. This approach amounts to assigning
a local utility function to each agent so that their selfish
maximization recovers the desired system level objective, i.e.
jointly maximizes a given objective function.
In Part I of this work we applied this game design approach
to a class of combinatorial resource allocation problems, where
a finite number of agents need to be allocated to a set
of resources, with the goal of maximizing a given welfare
function, additive over the resources. In this context, the notion
of price of anarchy (the ratio between the worst-performing
Nash equilibrium and the optimum over a set of instances)
was used as the performance metric. Indeed, any algorithm
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capable of computing a Nash equilibrium will inherit a worst
case approximation ratio equal to the price of anarchy (PoA).
More specifically, we tackled the utility design problem, i.e.
we asked the following two questions:
i) Given local utility functions, how do we characterize the
price of anarchy?
ii) Is it possible to select utility functions so as to maximize
such performance metric?
In Part I we show how to compute and optimize the price
of anarchy by means of a tractable linear program. In this
manuscript we specialize the general results obtained in Part
I to the case of submodular, supermodular and set covering
problems. In all the forthcoming analysis, we consider the
notion of pure Nash equilibrium.
Contributions. The main contributions are as follows.
1) Relative to a class of monotone submodular resource
allocation problems, we provide the analytical expression
of the PoA as a function of the utilities assigned to every
agent (Theorem 1). To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first result that gives an exact characterization (i.e.
tight) of the PoA for the considered class of problems.
We specialize this result to the Shapley value and marginal
contribution mechanisms, recovering a partial result pre-
sented in [7] and limited to Shapley value. Finally, we show
how the performance certificates offered by this approach
improve on existing approximation algorithms.
2) Relative to set covering problems, we characterize the PoA
as the maximum between O(n) numbers (Theorem 2)
and recover a previous result presented in [8], [9] under
the additional assumptions therein required.1 Optimally
designed utilities yield a PoA of 1 − 1/e, where e is the
Euler’s number.
3) Relative to supermodular problems, we provide a tight
expression for PoA (Theorem 3), complementing previous
bounds appearing in [10], [11]. Limited to this case, we
observe that the performance offered by the game theoretic
approach is rather poor.
4) We present two applications and show how the game the-
oretic approach yields improved theoretical and numerical
performances.
Organization. Section II briefly introduces the problem for-
mulation, the game theoretic approach as well as two results
presented in Part I. The complexity of computing a (pure) Nash
equilibrium is then discussed in Subsection II-E. In Sections
III, IV and V we specialize the results presented in Part I to
the case of submodular, set covering, supermodular problems
1n represents the number of agents in the system.
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2and present two corresponding applications. All the proofs are
reported in Appendix B.
Notation. For any two positive integers p ≤ q, denote [p] =
{1, . . . , p} and [p, q] = {p, . . . , q}. We use N, R>0 and R≥0
to denote the set of natural numbers, positive and non negative
real numbers, respectively. We denote with 1n the vector with
n unit entries, and with |I| the cardinality of the finite set I.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PERFORMANCE METRICS
In the first two subsections we briefly introduce the problem
formulation and the game theoretic approach followed. An in
depth presentation, motivation and discussion of these can be
found in Part I of this work [12, Sec. II].
A. Problem formulation
Let R = {r1, . . . , rm} be a finite set of resources, where
each resource r ∈ R is associated with a value vr ≥ 0 describ-
ing its importance. Further consider N = {1, . . . , n} a set of
agents. Every agent i ∈ N selects ai, a subset of the resources,
from the given collection Ai ⊆ 2R, i.e. ai ∈ Ai. The welfare
of an allocation a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A = A1 × · · · × An is
W (a) :=
∑
r∈∪i∈Nai
vrw(|a|r), (1)
where W : A → R, and |a|r = |{i ∈ N s.t. r ∈ ai}| captures
the number of agents selecting resource r in allocation a. The
function w : [n] → R≥0 is called the welfare basis function.
The objective of the system designer is to find a feasible
allocation maximizing the welfare, i.e
aopt ∈ argmax
a∈A
W (a) .
We will often use a−i = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , an) to
denote the decision of all the agents but i.
B. A game theoretic approach
In order to obtain a distributed solution to the previous
problem, we follow the game theoretic approach presented
in [12], [13] and assign to each agent i ∈ N a local utility
function ui : A → R≥0 of the form
ui(a) =
∑
r∈ai
vrf(|a|r) , (2)
where f : [n] → R constitutes our design choice; we refer
to it as to the utility generating mechanism, or simply the
mechanism. We identify the game introduced above with the
tuple
G = (N,R,A, {vr}r∈R, w, f) , (3)
and introduce the following family of games.
Definition 1. We let Gnf,w be the set containing all games
G of the form (3), where R is any set of resources, A is any
allocation set, {vr}r∈R is any tuple of resource values, w is a
welfare basis with w(j) > 0 for all j, f is any mechanism, and
i) the number of agents is upper bounded by |N | ≤ n,
ii) the optimum value satisfies W (aopt) > 0.
Given a mechanism f , we measure its performance on the
class Gnf,w adapting the notion of price of anarchy [14] as
PoA(f, w, n) = inf
G∈Gnf,w
(
mina∈NE(G)W (a)
maxa∈AW (a)
)
, (4)
where NE(G) denotes the set of pure Nash equilibria of G.
Since f and w associate a real number to every integer number
{1, . . . , n}, we often denote f and w as vectors in Rn. Given
a mechanism f : [n] → R and a welfare basis function w :
[n] → R>0, in the remaining of this manuscript we extend
their definition (with slight abuse of notation) to f : [0, n +
1]→ R and w : [0, n+ 1]→ R≥0, where we set the first and
last components to be identically zero, i.e. f(0) = w(0) = 0,
f(n+ 1) = w(n+ 1) = 0.2
Observe that whenever a (distributed) algorithm is available
to compute a Nash equilibrium, the price of anarchy also
represents the approximation ratio of the corresponding al-
gorithm over all the instances G ∈ Gnf,w.3 For this reason, the
price of anarchy defined in (4) will serve as the performance
metric in all the forthcoming analysis. The overarching goal of
this work is to characterize and optimize the price of anarchy
PoA(f, w, n) over a set of admissible mechanisms.
C. Shapley value and marginal contribution mechanisms
We conclude this section by introducing two well-studied
mechanisms that have attracted the researchers’ attention due
to their simple interpretation and to their special properties: the
Shapley value and the marginal contribution mechanism [16].
Definition 2. The Shapley value and marginal contribution
mechanism are identified with fSV an fMC, respectively. For
j ∈ [n], they are given by
fSV(j) =
w(j)
j
, (5)
fMC(j) = w(j)− w(j − 1) . (6)
Observe that the Shapley value is the only mechanism for
which the sum of the players utility exactly matches the total
welfare over all instances. The marginal contribution mecha-
nism takes its name from the observation that (2) reduces to
ui(a)=
∑
r∈ai
vrfMC(|a|r)
=
∑
r∈ai
vr(w(|a|r)− w(|a|r − 1)) =W (a)−W (∅, a−i),
i.e. player’s i utility function represent its marginal contribu-
tion to the welfare, that is the difference between W (a) and
the welfare generated when player i is removed from the game.
2This adjustment does not play any role, but is required to avoid the use
of cumbersome notation in the forthcoming expressions. Else, e.g., fMC(1)
in (6) will not be defined.
3For the class of games with utility functions (2), a pure Nash equilibrium
is guaranteed to exist, as G is a congestion game for any choice of f , [15].
3D. Two results from Part I
In Part I of this work, we showed how it is possible to
compute PoA(f, w, n) as the solution of a tractable linear
program (in its primal or dual form). Additionally, we showed
how the problem of optimizing such performance metric can
also be posed as a tractable linear program. Two results
presented in Part I that are needed in the development of Part II
are summarized for completeness in the following Proposition.
Before doing so, we introduce a useful set of integer tuples
IR := {(a, x, b) ∈ [0, n]3 with a+ x+ b ≥ 1
s.t. a · x · b = 0 or a+ x+ b = n} .
Proposition 1 (Characterizing and optimizing PoA, [12]).
i) Let w ∈ Rn>0 be a welfare basis function, and let f ∈ Rn.
• If f(1) ≤ 0, then PoA(f, w, n) = 0 for any n ∈ N.
• If instead f(1) > 0, n ∈ N, the price of anarchy (4) is
given by PoA(f, w, n) = 1/W ? , where W ? is the value
of the following (dual) program
W ? = min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t. w(b+x)−µw(a+x)+λ[af(a+x)− bf(a+x+1)]≤0
∀(a, x, b) ∈ IR.
(7)
ii) Let w ∈ Rn>0 be a welfare basis function, n ∈ N. The
design problem argmaxf∈Rn PoA(f, w, n) is equivalent
to the following LP in n+ 1 scalar unknowns
(f?, µ?) ∈ argmin
f∈Rn
f(1)≥1, µ∈R
µ
s.t.w(b+ x)− µw(a+ x) + af(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1) ≤ 0
∀(a, x, b) ∈ IR.
(8)
In the forthcoming sections we specialize these general state-
ments and obtain analytical results for the case of submodular,
supermodular and set covering problems.
E. Complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria
Part I and Part II of this work provide performance cer-
tificates relative to any pure Nash equilibrium allocation. As
already mentioned, the price of anarchy also represents the
approximation ratio of any algorithm capable of computing
one such equilibrium over all the instances G ∈ Gnf,w. In the
following we limit our study to the best response algorithm,
even though others have been proposed.
For ease of presentation, we consider a round-robin best
response algorithm, i.e., an algorithm where the players revise
their decision in a given order.4 With a single round of the best
response algorithm we identify the process where all players
update their decision once, in a given order. While computing a
(pure) Nash equilibrium is a NP-hard task for a general game
[17], all the games instances G considered in this work are
congestion games [18] regardless of what f is chosen. Relative
4Nevertheless, similar statements can still be made almost surely if the
players updating their decision are uniformly randomly selected form [n].
This will produce a totally asynchronous algorithm.
to this class of games, the following proposition provides
sufficient conditions under which the best response algorithm
has polynomial running time. The main assumption amounts
to requiring each of the agent’s allocation set to coincide with
the set of bases of a matroid. The definition of matroid, its
rank, as well as related notions are reported in Appendix A.
Proposition 2. [19, Thm. 2.5] Consider the congestion game
G and assume the allocation sets Ai are the set of bases for
some matroid Mi = (R, Ii) over the set of resources R.
Then, players reach a (pure) Nash equilibrium after at most
n2m maxi∈N rank(Mi) best responses.
Examples. The case when feasible allocations are singletons
does satisfy the assumptions of the previous theorem, even if
an agent does not have access to all the possible resources. One
such example is the following: R = {r1, . . . , rm}, m > 2,
Ai = {{r1}, {r2}}. Define Ii = {∅, {r1}, {r2}}. We have
that Mi := (R, Ii) is a matroid of rank 1 and that Ai is a
set of bases for Mi, see Appendix A for the details. In the
same Appendix, we provide a further example of allocations
set satisfying the property required in the previous proposition
(the case of uniform matroid).
On the negative side, it is simple to construct examples
that do not satisfy the requirements. For instance, consider
R = {r1, . . . , rm}, m ≥ 3 and Ai = {{r1}, {r2, r3}}. The
set Ai can not be the set of bases for any matroid Mi, as all
bases must have the same number of elements (see Appendix
A) while {r1} and {r2, r3} do not.
Remark 1. The previous theorem gives condition under which
the maximum number of best responses required to converge to
a Nash equilibrium is polynomially bounded in the number of
players and resources. If it is possible to compute a single best
response polynomially in the number of resources, then the
performance guarantee given by PoA is achievable in poly-
nomial time by the best response algorithm. The applications
presented in Subsections III-B, IV-A satisfy these assumptions.
III. THE CASE OF SUBMODULAR WELFARE FUNCTION
In this section we focus on the case when the welfare basis
function w is non-decreasing and concave (in the discrete
sense). This results in the total welfare W (a) of Equation
(1) being monotone submodular. Submodular functions model
problems with diminishing returns and are used to describe
a wide range of engineering applications such as satellite
assignment problems [20], Adwords for e-commerce [21], and
combinatorial auctions [22], among others.
For the considered class of problems, we show (Theorem 1)
that characterizing the price of anarchy reduces to computing
the maximum between n(n+ 1)/2 ∼ O(n2) numbers. Using
this result, we give an explicit expression of the price of
anarchy for the well known Shapley value and marginal
contribution mechanisms (Corollary 1). We then show how
to design f so as to maximize the performance measured by
PoA(f, w, n). Finally, we compare our performance certifi-
cates with existing approximation results. We conclude the
section with an application to the vehicle target assignment
problem.
4Assumption 1. Throughout this section we assume that the
function w is non-decreasing and concave, in the following
sense
w(j + 1) ≥ w(j) ,
w(j + 1)− w(j) ≤ w(j)− w(j − 1) ∀j ∈ [n− 1] .
Further we assume that w(1) = 1.5
As a consequence of Assumption 1, the function W (a) is
monotone and submodular i.e. it satisfies the following:
Monotonicity:
∀ a, b ∈ A s.t. ai ⊆ bi ∀i ∈ N =⇒ W (a) ≤W (b) .
Submodularity:
∀ a, b ∈ A s.t. ai ⊆ bi ∀i ∈ N,
∀ c ∈ 2Rn s.t. a˜i := ai∪ ci∈ Ai, b˜i := bi∪ci ∈ Ai ∀i ∈N,
=⇒ W (a˜)−W (a) ≥W (b˜)−W (b) .
While Proposition 1 gives a general answer on how to de-
termine the price of anarchy, it is possible to exploit the
additional properties given by Assumptions 1 to obtain an
explicit expression of PoA(f, w, n). Before delving in the
details, note that if f(1) ≤ 0, the corresponding price of
anarchy is zero (see Proposition 1). Thus we consider only the
non-trivial case of f(1) > 0. In this respect, observe that the
price of anarchy does not change by scaling f with a positive
constant, see [12, Lemma 4]. Therefore, in the following we
consider only the case of f(1) = 1, without loss of generality.
Theorem 1 (PoA for submodular welfare). Consider a
mechanism f such that f(1) = 1, f(j) is non increasing, and
f(j) ≥ fMC(j) for all j ∈ [n]. Then, PoA(f, w, n) = 1/W ?,
W ?= max
l≤j∈[n]
{
w(l)
w(j)
+min(j, n−l) f(j)
w(j)
−min(l, n−j)f(j+1)
w(j)
}
.
(9)
The proof is reported in Appendix B and amounts to show-
ing that λ appearing in [12, Cor. 1] can be computed a priori,
and takes the value λ? = 1. The requirements on f(j) being
non increasing and f(j) ≥ fMC(j) might seem restrictive at
first. Nevertheless, similar assumptions where made relative
to a simpler class of problems in [7], [8]. Additionally, the
Shapley value and marginal contribution mechanisms (and not
only) satisfy these assumptions. Thus, a direct application of
Theorem 1 returns the exact price of anarchy of fSV and fMC,
as detailed in the following.
Corollary 1 (Exact PoA for fSV and fMC).
i) The price of anarchy for the Shapley value mechanism is
PoA(fSV, w, n) = 1/W
?
SV, where
W ?SV = max
l≤j∈[n]
{
w(l)
w(j)
+min(j, n−l)1
j
−min(l, n−j) w(j + 1)
(j + 1)w(j)
}
.
(10)
5The requirement w(1) = 1 is without loss of generality. Indeed, If w(1) 6=
1, it is possible to normalize its value and reduce to the case w(1) = 1, since
w(1) > 0 by Definition 1.
ii) The price of anarchy for the marginal contribution mech-
anism is PoA(fMC, w, n) = 1/W ?MC, where
W ?MC =1+max
j∈[n]
{
1
w(j)
min(j, n−j)[2w(j)−w(j−1)−w(j+1)]
}
(11)
The proof is reported in Appendix B. The previous Corol-
lary shows that the price of anarchy of the Shapley value
and marginal contribution mechanisms can be computed as
the maximum of n(n+ 1)/2 and n numbers, respectively.
Remark 2. The expression for W ?SV appearing in (10) can be
equivalently written as
W ?SV=1+ max
l≤j∈[n]
{
w(l)
w(j)
− 1
j
[max{j+l−n, 0}+min{l, n−j}β(j)]
}
(12)
where β(j) :=
j
j + 1
w(j + 1)
w(j)
.
The previous expression partially matches the result in [7,
Thm. 6], where the authors used a different approach to obtain
a bound on the price of anarchy for the larger class of coarse
correlated equilibria (CCE), but limitedly to fSV and singleton
problems. More precisely, [7, Thm. 6] provides an estimate of
the price of anarchy relative to fSV, as the minimum between
two expression. While their first expression exactly matches
(12), the second one is not present here. Nevertheless, it is
possible to show that such additional expression is redundant,
as the first one is always the most constraining.6 This allows
us to conclude that the bound obtained in [7, Thm. 6] precisely
matches the one in (12). Since our result is provably tight for
the class of Nash equilibria, and the result in [7] provides a
lower bound for CCE, such bound is tight also for the set of
CCE, and the worst performing coarse correlated equilibrium
is, simply, a pure Nash equilibrium.
For the submodular welfare case considered here, it is
still possible to determine the mechanism f? that maximizes
PoA(f, w, n) as the solution of a tractable linear program
either directly employing the more general result in (8) or
using the following linear program derived from (9), which
additionally constrains the admissible mechanism f to satisfy
f(j) ≥ fMC(j) and f(j) to be non increasing,
f? ∈ argmin
f∈F, µ∈R
µ
s.t. µw(j)≥w(l) + jf(j)−lf(j+1)
∀j, l ∈ [0, n] s.t. j ≥ l and 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n,
µw(j)≥w(l)+(n−l)f(j)−(n−j)f(j+1)
∀j, l ∈ [0, n] s.t. j ≥ l and j + l ≥ n ,
(13)
where F = {f ∈ Rn |f(1) ≥ 1, f(j)≥ fMC(j), f(j + 1)≤
f(j), ∀j ∈ [n]}.
Figure 1 compares the price of anarchy (and thus the
approximation ratio of any algorithm capable of computing a
Nash equilibrium) of the Shapley value, marginal contribution
6This statement is not formally shown here, in the interest of space. Its
proof amounts to showing that the second expression appearing in [7, Thm.
6] is always upper bounded by (12), thanks to the concavity of w.
5and optimal mechanism f?, in the case when w(j) = jd with
0 ≤ d ≤ 1, |N | ≤ 20. They have been computed using
respectively (10), (11) and (7), where f? has been determined
as the solution to (8). While for values of 0.5 ≤ d ≤ 1 the
Shapley value mechanism performs close to the optimal, its
performance degrades for 0 ≤ d < 0.5 and for d = 0 it
reaches the lower bound of 1/2, as predicted for the class
of valid utility games defined in [23, Thm. 5]. The marginal
contribution mechanism instead, performs the worst amongst
the considered ones. While f? will always perform better
or equal than any other mechanism, it is unclear if, and to
what extent, fSV outperforms fMC in the general settings.
The expressions in (10) and (11) could nevertheless be used
to provide an answer to this question.
A. Improved approximation and comparison with existing
result
For the general class of submodular maximization problems
subject to matroid constraints, the best approximation ratio
achievable in polynomial time has been shown to be [24]
1− c
e
, (14)
where c represents the curvature of the welfare function (see
[25] for its definition) and e the Euler’s number. For this class
of problems, no polynomial time algorithm can do better than
(14) on all instances. Relative to the subclass of problems
considered here, i.e., those problems where W has the special
structure in (1), the curvature can be computed as c = 1 +
w(n− 1)−w(n). In Figure 1 we plot the approximation ratio
(14) for the class of problems considered here, with the choice
of w(j) = jd, i.e., we plot (red curve) the quantity
App = 1− 1 + w(n− 1)− w(n)
e
, (15)
for 0 ≤ d ≤ 1. We observe that the optimal mechanism f?
outperforms (15) for different values of d, so that, when there
exists an algorithm capable of computing a Nash equilibrium
in polynomial time (see Proposition 2), the approach presented
here gives improved guarantees compared to (14).
Remark 3. It is important to note that this is not in contra-
diction with the inapproximability result presented in [24], as
we are restricting the admissible instances to a subset of the
general class of submodular maximization problems studied
in the latter work.
B. Application: the vehicle target allocation problem
In the following we consider the vehicle target assignment
problem introduced in [26] and studied in [7], [27]. We are
given a finite set of targets R, and for each target r ∈ R
its relative importance vr ≥ 0. Additionally, we are given a
finite set of vehicles N = {1, . . . , n}, and for each vehicle
a set of feasible target assignments Ai ∈ 2R. The goal is to
distributedly compute a feasible allocation ai ∈ Ai so as to
maximize the joint probability of successfully destroying the
selected targets, expressed as
W (a) :=
∑
r∈∪i∈Nai
vr(1− (1− p)|a|r ),
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
d
PoASV
PoAMC
PoA?
App
Fig. 1. Comparison between the approximation ratio (15) and the price of
anarchy of the optimal mechanism f? (determined as the solution of (8)),
Shapley value fSV and marginal contribution fMC, denoted with PoA?,
PoASV and PoAMC, respectively. The problems considered features |N | ≤
n = 20 agents and a welfare basis of the form w(j) = jd with 0 ≤ d ≤ 1
represented over the x-axis.
where (1 − (1 − p)|a|r ) is the probability that |a|r vehicles
eliminate the target vr and the scalar quantity 0 < p ≤ 1
is a parameter representing the probability that a vehicle will
successfully destroy a target. In the forthcoming presentation,
it is assumed that the success probability p is the same for
all vehicles, else one would have to define a different pi for
every i ∈ N . Observe that the welfare considered here has the
form (1) with welfare basis (1 − (1 − p)|a|r ). We normalize
this quantity (without affecting the problem’s solution) so that
w(1) = 1 and thus define
w(|a|r) := 1− (1− p)
|a|r
1− (1− p) . (16)
Observe that (16) satisfies the Assumption 2 in that w(j) >
0 and w(j) is increasing and concave. Thus, it is possible
to compute the performance guarantee of any set of utility
functions of the form (2), and to determine the best mechanism
f ∈ Rn by solving a corresponding linear program.
Figure 2 shows the achievable approximation ratios for the
Shapley value, marginal contribution, optimal mechanisms,
as well as the bound in (15). We observe that the optimal
mechanism significantly outperforms all the others as well as
the bound of (15) for non trivial values of p. In the extreme
case of p = 1, f? matches (15), while for small p all the design
methodologies offer a similarly high performance guarantee.
Figure 3 shows the mechanisms fSV, fMC and f?.
In both Figures 2 and 3 we have set the number of agents
to be relatively small7 i.e. |N | ≤ n = 10. This choice was
purely made so as to perform an exhaustive search simulation
in order to test the provided bounds displayed in Figure 2.
More specifically, we considered 105 random instances of the
vehicle target assignment problem. Each instance features n =
10 agents, n + 1 resources and fixed p = 0.8. Each agent is
equipped with an action set with only two allocations, whose
elements are singletons, i.e. |ai| = 1. We believe this is not
restrictive in assessing the performance, as the structure of
7Similar trends and conclusions can be obtained with larger values of n.
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Fig. 2. Price of anarchy and approximation ratio comparison between the
optimal mechanism f?, the Shapley value mechanism fSV, the marginal
contribution fMC mechanism and (15), denoted with PoA?, PoASV and
PoAMC, respectively. The problems considered features |N | ≤ n = 10
vehicles and a welfare basis of the form w(j) = 1−(1−p)
j
1−(1−p) with 0 < p ≤ 1
represented over the x-axis.
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Fig. 3. Mechanisms fSV, fMC and optimal mechanisms f? obtained solving
(8) for the specific choice of w(j) in (16) with |N | ≤ n = 10 and p = 0.5.
some worst case instances is of this form [9]. Observe that
any constraint set Ai where feasible allocations are singletons
is the bases of a uniform matroid of rank one (upon adding the
allocation ∅ to each Ai), see Appendix A. Further note that
computing a single best response is a polynomial operation
in the number of resources. Thus, the best response algorithm
will converge polynomially to a Nash equilibrium (Proposition
2) and so the performance guarantees offered by PoA can
quickly achieved.
The structure of the constraints sets Ai and the values
of the resources are randomly generated, the latter with
uniform distribution in the interval [0, 1]. For this class of
problems considered, the theoretical worst case performance
is PoA(fSV, w, n) ≈ 0.568, PoA(fMC, w, n) ≈ 0.556,
PoA(f?, w, n) ≈ 0.688 (see Figure 2 with p = 0.8).
For each instance G generated, we performed an exhaustive
search so as to compute the welfare at the worst equilibrium
mina∈NE(G)W (a) and the value W (aopt). The ratio between
these quantities (their empirical cumulative distribution) is
plotted across the 105 samples in Figure 4, for fSV, fMC,
f?. In the same figure the vertical dashed lines represent the
theoretical bound on the price of anarchy, while the markers
represent the worst case performance occurred in simulations.
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Fig. 4. Cumulative distribution of the ratio mina∈NE(G)W (a)/W (aopt)
for fSV, fMC, f? across 105 samples constructed as detailed in Subsection
III-B. The dashed lines represent the theoretical value of PoA(fSV, w, n),
PoA(fMC, w, n), PoA(f?, w, n) while the corresponding markers identify
the worst case performance encountered during the simulations.
First, we observe that no instance has performed worse than
the corresponding price of anarchy, as predicted by Propo-
sition 1. Second, we note that the worst case performance
encountered in the simulation is circa 15% better than the
true worst case instance.8 Further, the optimal mechanism f?
has outperformed the others also in the simulations. Its worst
case performance is indeed superior to the others (markers
in Figure 4). Additionally, the cumulative distribution of f?
lies below the cumulative distributions of fSV and fMC (for
abscissas smaller than 0.95). This means that, for any given
approximation ratio 0 ≤ r ≤ 0.95, there is a smaller fraction of
problems on which f? performs worse or equal to r, compared
to fSV and fMC. Observe that this is not obvious a priori, as
f? is designed to maximize the worst case performance and
not e.g., the average performance.
IV. THE CASE OF COVERING PROBLEMS
In this section we specialize the previous results to the case
of set covering problems. In set covering problems the goal is
to allocate agents to resources so as to maximize the total value
of covered resources. The corresponding welfare is given by∑
r∈∪i∈Nai
vr ,
which is obtained with the choice of w(j) = 1 for all j in (1)
and (2). Set covering problems are a subclass of submodular
resource allocation problems (they satisfy Assumption 1),
and are used to model engineering problems such as sensor
allocation problems [28]. Due to their importance in the
applications, we treat their study separately to the general
submodular case.
8Recall that our result in Proposition 1 is tight i.e., there exists at least one
instance achieving exactly an efficiency equal to the price of anarchy.
7Relative to covering problems, we provide a general ex-
pression for the price of anarchy as a function of f (Theorem
2) and show how this reduces to the results obtained in [8],
[9], under the additional assumptions therein required. We
conclude the section with an application to caching in wireless
data networks.
Theorem 2. Consider set covering problems i.e., fix w(j) = 1
∀j ∈ [n]. Let f ∈ Rn≥0 with f(1) = 1. The price of anarchy
is PoA(f, 1n, n) = 1/W ?,
W ? = 1+max
j∈[n−1]
{(j+1)f(j+1)−1, jf(j)−f(j+1), jf(j+1)}.
(17)
The proof can be found in Appendix B. The previous
Theorem gives a simple and explicit way to compute the
price of anarchy (4) as the maximum between 3(n − 1)
numbers. Theorem 2 extends the previous bounds derived in
[8], [9]. In the latter works, the authors additionally required
the admissible mechanisms to be non increasing and such that
jf(j) ≤ 1 for all j ∈ [n]. The next Corollary shows how the
result in the previous theorem matches the results in [8], [9],
under the additional assumptions therein required. The proof
is reported in Appendix B.
Corollary 2. Let f ∈ Rn≥0 with f(1) = 1 be non increasing.
The expression in (17) is given by
W ? = 1 + max
j∈[n−1]
{jf(j)− f(j + 1), (n− 1)f(n)} . (18)
In [8, Thm. 2] the author provides a bound matching the
expression in (18). Tightness of the previous bound is shown
in [9, Thm. 1]. Additionally, [8, Eq. 5] also determines the
mechanism maximizing the price of anarchy (18) as
f?(j) := (j − 1)!
1
(n−1)(n−1)! +
∑n−1
i=j
1
i!
1
(n−1)(n−1)! +
∑n−1
i=1
1
i!
, j ∈ [n] . (19)
Nevertheless, the feasible set of mechanisms is limited to
jf(j) ≤ 1 and f non increasing. Using the result provided
here in Theorem 2 it is possible to determine the best
mechanism (via a linear program derived from (17)) without
imposing this additional constraints. Numerical simulations
have shown that the optimal mechanism obtained optimizing
(17) precisely matches the one derived in [8], so that removing
the additional assumption required therein does not improve
the best achievable price of anarchy.9
Remark 4. Relative to set covering problems, the work [8]
explicitly determines the value of the price of anarchy for the
best mechanism. In the limit as n→∞, it’s value amounts to
1− 1
e
and thus exactly matches the result in (14), since for covering
problems it is c = 1− w(n)− w(n− 1) = 1.
9This statement con be formally proved, by showing that the optimal
mechanism derived in [8] solves the KKT system of the LP corresponding to
the problem of minimizing W ? given in (17). We do not pursue this, in the
interest of space.
A. Application: content distribution in wireless data networks
In this section we consider the problem of distributed data
caching introduced in [29] as a technique to reduce peak traffic
in mobile data networks. In order to alleviate the growing
radio congestion caused by the recent surge of mobile data
traffic, the latter work suggested to store popular and spectrum
intensive items (such as movies or songs) in geographically
distributed stations. The approach has the advantage of bring-
ing the content closer to the customer, and to avoid recurring
transmission of large quantities of data. Similar offloading
techniques, aiming at minimizing the peak traffic demand
by storing popular items at local cells, have been recently
proposed and studied in the context of modern 5G mobile
networks [30], [31]. The fundamental question we seek to
answer in this section is how to geographically distribute the
popular items across the nodes of a network so as to maximize
the total number of queries fulfilled. In the following we
borrow the model introduced in [29] and show how the utility
design approach presented here yields improved theoretical
and practical performances.
We consider a rectangular grid with nx × ny bins and a
finite set R of data items. For each item r ∈ R, we are given
its query rate qr ≥ 0 as well as its position in the grid Or and
a radius ρr. A circle of radius ρr centered in Or represents the
region where the item r is requested. Additionally we consider
a set of geographically distributed nodes N (the local cells),
where each node i ∈ N is assigned to a position in the grid Pi.
A node is assigned a set of feasible allocations Ai according
to the following rules:
i) Ai ⊆ 2Ri , where Ri := {r ∈ R s.t. ||Or − Pi||2 ≤ ρr}.
That is, r ∈ Ri if the (euclidean) distance between the
position of node i and item r is smaller equal to ρr.
ii) |Ai| ≤ ki, for some ki ∈ [1,∞[.
In other words, node i can include the resource r in his
allocation ai only if he is in the region where the item r
is requested (first rule), while we limit the number of stored
items to ki for reasons of space (second rule).10 The situation
is exemplified in Figure 5.
The objective is to select a feasible allocation for every node so
as to jointly maximize the total amount of queries fulfilled, i.e.,
max
a∈A
∑
r∈∪i∈Nai
qr .
In order to obtain a distributed algorithm, [29] proposes a
game theoretic approach where each agent is given a Shapley
value utility function, i.e., they assign to agents utilities of the
form (2), where f(j) = fSV(j) = w(j)/j.
In the following we compare the results of numerical
simulations obtained using fSV or f? in (19). The following
parameters are employed. We choose nx = ny = 800,
|N | = 100, |R| = 1000. The nodes and the data items are
uniformly randomly placed in the grid. The query rate of data
10Similarly to what discussed for the application of Subsection III-B, it
is possible to reduce the problem to the case where Ai are the bases of a
matroidMi, so that Proposition 2 applies here too. Once more computing the
best response is a polynomial task (it amounts to sorting qrw(|a|r)f(|a|r)
and picking the ki first items). Thus the best response algorithm converges
in polynomial time.
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Fig. 5. The nodes 1, 2 can include the query r in any allocation i.e. r ∈ R1
and r ∈ R2 since the distance from nodes 1, 2 to Or is less than ρr .
items is chosen according to a power law (Zipf distribution)
qr = 1/r
α for r ∈ [1, 1000].11 The radii of interests are set
to be identical for all items ρr = ρ = 200. We let α vary in
0.7 ≤ α ≤ 0.9. We consider 105 instances of such problem,
and for every instance compute a Nash equilibrium by means
of the best response algorithm. Given the size of the problem,
it is not possible to compute the optimal allocation and thus the
price of anarchy. As a surrogate for the latter we use the ratio
W (ane)/Wtot, where ane is the Nash equilibrium determined
by the algorithm and
Wtot :=
∑
r∈R
qr
is simply the sum of all the query rates and thus is an upper
bound for W (aopt). Observe that Wtot is a constant for all
the simulations with fixed α, indeed Wtot =
∑
r≤1000
1
rα
and thus serves as a mere scaling factor. The theoretical
price of anarchy for large n is PoA(fSV,1n, n) = 0.5 (tight
also when the query rates are Zipf distributed [29]) and
PoA(f?,1n, n) = 1 − 1/e ≈ 0.632. Figure 6 compares the
quantity W (ane)/Wtot for the choice of fSV and f?, across
different values of α. First we observe that the worst cases
encountered in the simulations are at least 10% better than
the theoretical counterparts. Further, for each fixed value of
α, there is a good separation between the performance of fSV
and f?, in favor of the latter. This holds true, not only in the
worst case sense (markers in the Figure 6), but also on average.
As α increases from 0.6 to 0.9, the worst case performance
seems to degrade for both fSV and f?. Nevertheless, since we
are using W (ane)/Wtot as a surrogate for the true price of
anarchy, it is unclear if the previous conclusion also holds for
W (ane)/W (aopt).
Figure 7 presents a more detailed comparison between fSV
and f? for a fixed value of α = 0.7 over all the 105 instances.
Relative to this case, Figure 8 describes the (distribution of the)
number of best response rounds required for the algorithm to
converge. Quick convergence is achieved, with a number of
best response rounds equal to 11 in the worst case. Observe
that in every best response round all players have a chance to
update their decision variable, so that a total number of nBR
rounds amounts to n·nBR individual best responses.
11Typical query rate curves has been shown to follow this distribution, with
0.6 ≤ α ≤ 0.9, see [32].
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Fig. 6. Box plot comparing the performance of the best response algorithm
on 105 instances for the choice of mechanisms fSV and f?, across different
values of α. On each plot, the median is represented with a red line, and the
corresponding box contains the 25th and 75th percentiles. The (four) worst
cases are represented with crosses.
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Fig. 7. Distribution of W (ane)/Wtot on 105 instances for fixed α = 0.7.
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Fig. 8. Distribution of the number of best response rounds required for
convergence on 105 instances, α = 0.7.
V. THE CASE OF SUPERMODULAR WELFARE FUNCTION
In this section we consider welfare basis functions that
are non-decreasing and convex, resulting in a monotone and
supermodular total welfare W (a). Applications featuring this
property include but are not limited to clustering and image
9segmentation [33], power allocation in multiuser networks
[34]. In the following we explicitly characterize the price
of anarchy for the class of supermodular resource allocation
problems as a function of f (Theorem 3), extending [10],
[11]. Additionally, we show that the Shapley value mechanism
maximizes this measure of efficiency (recovering the result in
[10], [11]), but is not the only one.
Assumption 2. Throughout this section we assume that w is
a non-decreasing and convex function, that is
w(j + 1) ≥ w(j) ,
w(j + 1)− w(j) ≥ w(j)− w(j − 1) ∀j ∈ [n− 1] .
Further we assume that w(1) = 1.
Theorem 3 (PoA for supermodular welfare). Consider a
mechanism f ∈ Rn such that f(1) = 1, f(j) ≥ 1 for all
j ∈ [n]. It holds
PoA(f, w, n) =
n
w(n)
1
maxj∈[n] j
f(j)
w(j)
.
It follows that fSV is optimal and achieves
PoA(fSV, w, n) =
n
w(n)
The proof is provided in Appendix B. Observe that the
Shapley value, and all the mechanisms f ∈ Rn≥0for which
jf(j) ≥ w(j) satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3. Indeed by
convexity of w it is w(j)/j ≥ 1, so that f(j) ≥ jf(j)/w(j) ≥
1 by non-negativity of f . Further note that the Shapley value
mechanism is not the unique maximizer of PoA(f, w, n).
Indeed, all the mechanisms with 1 ≤ f(j) ≤ w(j)/j are
optimal, since the previous theorem applies and they have
jf(j)/w(j) ≤ 1. Figure 9 compares the price of anarchy of the
Shapley value, marginal contribution and optimal mechanisms,
in the case when w(j) = jd with 1 ≤ d ≤ 2, |N | ≤ 20. First,
we observe that any optimal mechanisms, and fSV give the
same performance, as predicted from Theorem 3. Additionally,
we observe that the quality of the approximation quickly
degrades as the welfare basis w gets steeper (d gets larger).
This is due to the fact that if w(n) grows much faster than n,
the quantity n/w(n) quickly decreases.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS
This manuscript specializes the results presented in Part I of
this work to the case of monotone submodular, supermodular
and set covering problems. First, we obtained an explicit
characterization of the worst case performance as a function
of the assigned utility functions. Second, we compared the
performance provided by optimally designed utility functions
with existing approximation results. For covering problems we
recover the 1 − 1/e result of [1], while for the submodular
case our bounds improve on the existing approximation results.
Finally, we tested the theoretical findings on two applications.
We remark on the fact that the performance certificates
obtained in this work are confined to the notion of (pure)
Nash equilibrium. While computing one such equilibrium is,
in general, a hard task, Proposition 2 showed that under
structural assumptions on the feasible sets {Ai}i∈N , this can
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
d
PoA(fSV, w, n)
PoA(fMC, w, n)
PoA(f?, w, n)
Fig. 9. Price of anarchy comparison between the optimal mechanism
f? determined as the solution of (8), Shapley value fSV and marginal
contribution fMC mechanisms. The problems considered features |N | ≤ 20
agents and a welfare basis of the form w(j) = jd with d ∈ [1, 2] represented
over the x-axis.
be accomplished in polynomial time. Whether the performance
certificates derived here hold for the larger class of coarse
correlated equilibria (CCE), is at this point an open question.12
The appeal of CCE lies in the fact that their calculation
is a simple, i.e. polynomial, task for the classes of games
considered here [35].
APPENDIX A
MATROIDS
Definition 3 (Matroid). A tuple M = (R, I) is a matroid if
R is a finite set of resources, I ⊆ 2R is a collection of subsets
of R, and the following two properties hold:
• If B ∈ I and A ⊆ B, then A ∈ I;
• If A ∈ I, B ∈ I and |B| > |A|, then there exists an
element r ∈ B \A s.t. A ∪ {r} ∈ I.
Definition 4 (Basis). A set S ∈ I such that for all r ∈ R\S,
(S ∪ r) /∈ I is called a basis of the matroid.
It can be shown that all basis have the same number of
elements, which is known as the rank of the matroid and
indicated with rank(M) [36].
A simple example of matroid is that of uniform matroid
defined as follows
Definition 5 (Uniform matroid). Given a finite set of resources
R with |R| = m, let I ⊆ 2R be the collection of all subsets
with a number of elements k ≤ m. M = (R, I) is a matroid
[36] and it is called the uniform matroid of rank(M) = k.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof. Observe that the claim we wish to prove (i.e. the value
of W ? in (9)) can be equivalently reformulated as in the
following program, upon observing that for j+ l ≤ n it holds
12On this respect, Remark 2 shows that this is the case limitedly to fSV.
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min(j, n− l) = j and min(l, n− j) = l, while for j + l > n
it holds min(j, n− l) = n− l and min(l, n− j) = n− j,
W ? = min
µ∈R
µ
s.t. µw(j)≥w(l) + jf(j)−lf(j+1)
∀j, l ∈ [0, n] s.t. j ≥ l and 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n,
µw(j)≥w(l)+(n−l)f(j)−(n−j)f(j+1)
∀j, l ∈ [0, n] s.t. j ≥ l and j + l > n .
In the following we prove that the latter program follows from
[12, Cor. 1] by showing that only the constraints with l ≤ j
are required, and that the decision variable λ in [12, Eq. (21)]
takes the value λ? = 1. First, notice that f(j) is assumed to be
non increasing, and so W ? can be correctly computed using
[12, Cor. 1]. For j = 0, the constraints in [12, Eq. (21)] read
as
λ ≥ w(l)
l
∀ l ∈ [n] ,
and the most binding amounts to λ ≥ 1, due the to concavity
of w. For j 6= 0, we intend to show that the constraints with
l > j appearing in [12, Eq. (21)] are not required since those
with j = l are more binding. The following figure explains
this more clearly
j
l
...
...
. .
. .
.
. . .
1 2 n 1 n
1
2
n 1
n
1
Fig. 10. The proof amounts to showing that for any constraint identified with
the indices (j, l) and l > j (circles in the figure), the constraint identified
with (j, j) is more binding (crosses in the figure).
To do so, we divide the discussion in two cases: i) l+j ≤ n
and ii) l + j > n.
i) When 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n and l > j, we want to show that for
any λ ≥ 1
1 + λ
j
w(j)
[f(j)− f(j + 1)] ≥
w(l)
w(j)
+ λ
[
j
w(j)
f(j)− l
w(j)
f(j + 1)
]
,
where the left hand side is obtained setting l = j. This is
equivalent to showing
w(l)− w(j) + λ(j − l)f(j + 1) ≤ 0 . (20)
By concavity of w and l > j, one observes that
w(l) ≤ w(j + 1) + (w(j + 1)− w(j))(l − j − 1)
= w(j) + (w(j + 1)− w(j))(l − j)
and since l− j > 0, w(j + 1)−w(j) ≥ 0, λ ≥ 1, it holds
w(l) ≤ w(j) + λ(w(j + 1)− w(j))(l − j). (21)
Using inequality (21), the inequality in (20) follows, since
w(l)− w(j) + λ(j − l)f(j + 1) ≤
≤ w(j) + λ(w(j + 1)− w(j))(l − j)
− w(j) + λ(j − l)f(j + 1)
= λ(l − j)(w(j + 1)− w(j)− f(j + 1)) ≤ 0 ,
where the last inequality holds because f(j + 1) ≥ w(j +
1) − w(j) (by assumption) and l > j. Observe that the
previous inequality is never evaluated for j = n, as there
is no l ∈ [n] with l > j = n.
ii) We now consider the case j + l > n and l > j. Here we
intend to prove that for any λ ≥ 1
1 + λ
n− j
w(j)
[f(j)− f(j + 1)] ≥
w(l)
w(j)
+ λ
[
n− l
w(j)
f(j)− n− j
w(j)
f(j + 1)
]
,
where the left hand side is obtained setting l = j. The
latter is equivalent to
w(l)− w(j) + λ(j − l)f(j) ≤ 0.
Similarly to (21), one can show that
w(l) ≤ w(j) + λ(w(j)− w(j − 1))(l − j),
and get the desired result as follows
w(l)− w(j) + λ(j − l)f(j)
≤ w(j) + λ(w(j)− w(j − 1))(l − j)
− w(j) + λ(j − l)f(j)
= λ(l − j)(w(j)− w(j − 1)− f(j)) ≤ 0 ,
where the last inequality holds because f(j) ≥ w(j) −
w(j − 1) (by assumption) and l > j.
The steps i) and ii) showed that W ? in [12, Eq. (21)] can be
equivalently computed as
W ? = min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t. µw(j)≥w(l) + λ[jf(j)−lf(j+1)]
∀j, l ∈ [0, n] s.t. j ≥ l and 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n,
µw(j)≥w(l)+λ[(n−l)f(j)−(n−j)f(j+1)]
∀j, l ∈ [0, n] s.t. j ≥ l and j + l ≥ n.
Every constraint appearing in the previous program is indexed
by (j, l). As already seen, the most binding constraint with
j = 0 yields λ ≥ 1, while all the constraints with j ≥ 1
can be compactly written as µ ≥ bjl + ajlλ, upon defining
bjl := w(l)/w(j) and consequently
ajl :=
{
jf(j)−lf(j+1) 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n,
(n−l)f(j)−(n−j)f(j+1) j + l ≥ n.
Consequently W ? can be computed as
W ? = min
λ≥1, µ∈R
µ
s.t. µ ≥ bjl + ajlλ ∀j, l ∈ [0, n], s.t. j ≥ l, j ≥ 1.
Observe that, when j ≥ 1 and j ≥ l, it holds ajl ≥ 0. Indeed
since f(j) is non increasing, for 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n one has
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ajl = jf(j)− lf(j+1) ≥ (j − l)f(j) ≥ 0. Similarly for
j + l ≥ n. Thus the optimal choice is to select λ as small as
possible i.e. λ? = 1.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Proof. The proof is an application of Theorem 1.
i) Observe that fSV satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1 in
that fSV(1) = 1, fSV(j) = w(j)/j is non increasing (due
to concavity of w) and it also hold that fSV(j) = w(j)/j ≥
w(j) − w(j − 1) (trivially satisfied for j = 1) since for
j > 1 this is equivalent to w(j)/j ≤ w(j − 1)/(j − 1),
which holds due to the concavity of w. Hence the result of
Theorem 1 applies and substituting f(j) = w(j)/j gives
W ?SV.
ii) Observe that fMC satisfies the assumption of Theorem 1
in that fMC(1) = 1, fMC(j) = w(j) − w(j − 1) is non
increasing (due to concavity of w).
We conclude by proving that the constraints indexed with
l ≤ j ∈ [n] are not needed and it is enough to consider
j = l ∈ [n], so that W ?MC is as given in Corollary 1, ii).
To do so, we show that for any l < j the most binding
constraint is given by l = j.
For l < j and j + l ≤ n we want to prove that
1 + λ
j
w(j)
[fMC(j)− fMC(j + 1)] ≥
w(l)
w(j)
+ λ
[
j
w(j)
fMC(j)− l
w(j)
fMC(j + 1)
]
,
where the left hand side is obtained setting l = j. The
previous is equivalent to
w(l)− w(j) + λ(j − l)fMC(j + 1) ≤ 0 ,
and since fMC(j + 1) = w(j + 1)− w(j), it reduces to
w(l)− w(j) + (j − l)(w(j + 1)− w(j)) ≤ 0 . (22)
By concavity of w and l < j, it holds that w(j) ≥ w(l) +
(j − l)(w(j + 1)− w(j)) and thus (22) follows.
In the case of l < j and j + l > n we intend to show
1 + λ
n− j
w(j)
[fMC(j)− fMC(j + 1)] ≥
w(l)
w(j)
+ λ
[
n− l
w(j)
fMC(j)− n− j
w(j)
fMC(j + 1)
]
,
which reduces to
w(l)− w(j) + (j − l)(w(j)− w(j − 1)) .
The latter follows by concavity of w. Hence, the price of
anarchy of fMC is governed by W ? as in Theorem 1, where
we set f = fMC and fix j = l. This gives the following
expression
W ?MC = 1 +max
j∈[n]
{
min(j, n− j)[
fMC(j)
w(j)
− fMC(j + 1)
w(j)
]}
,
which reduced to the expression for W ?MC in the claim,
upon substituting fMC(j) with its definition.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. The proof is a specialization of the general result
obtained in [12, Thm. 3] to the case of set covering problems.
We divide the study in three distinct cases, as in the following
C1 :
{
a+ x = 0
b+ x 6= 0
C2 :
{
a+ x 6= 0
b+ x = 0
C3 :
{
a+ x 6= 0
b+ x 6= 0
In case C1 it must be a = x = 0, b 6= 0 and the constraints
read as
λ ≥ 1
b
.
The most binding one is obtained for b = 1, i.e. it suffices to
have λ ≥ 1 in order to guarantee λ ≥ 1/b. In case C2 it must
be b = x = 0, a 6= 0. The constraints read as
µ ≥ λaf(a) ∀ a ∈ [n].
In case C3, since a + x 6= 0 and b + x 6= 0, the constraints
become
µ ≥ 1 + λ[af(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1)] .
If x = 0, then a, b > 0 and the previous inequality reads
µ ≥ 1 + λ[af(a)− bf(a+ 1)] a+ b ∈ [n], .
The most constraining inequality is obtained for b taking the
smallest possible value, that is b = 1. Thus 0 < a ≤ n − 1.
Consequently when x = 0, it suffices to have
µ ≥ 1 + λ[af(a)− f(a+ 1)] ∀a ∈ [n− 1] .
If x 6= 0, the most binding constraint is obtained for b = 0.
In such case, 0 < a+ x ≤ n and the constraints read as
µ ≥ 1 + λaf(a+ x) ∀a ∈ [n] .
For ease of readability, we introduce the variable j := a + x
and use j and x instead of a and x. With this new system of
indices the feasible region becomes 0 < j ≤ n and j−x ≥ 0,
x > 0. The constraints read as
µ ≥ 1 + λ(j − x)f(j)
and the most binding is trivially obtained for x = 1, reducing
the previous to
µ ≥ 1 + λ(j − 1)f(j) ∀ j ∈ [n] .
This guarantees that the program in [12, Eq. (20)] is
equivalent to
W ? = min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t. λ ≥ 1
µ ≥ λjf(j) j ∈ [n]
µ ≥ 1 + λ(jf(j)− f(j + 1)) j ∈ [n− 1]
µ ≥ 1 + λ(j − 1)f(j) j ∈ [n] .
Amongst the last three set of constraints, the tightest constraint
always features a positive coefficient multiplying λ. Indeed
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the only term multiplying λ that could take negative values is
jf(j)−f(j+1), but every time this is negative, the constraints
µ ≥ 1 + λ(j − 1)f(j) are tighter. It follows that the solution
consists in picking λ as small as possible, that is in choosing
λ? = 1. The program becomes
W ? =min
µ∈R
µ
s.t. µ ≥ jf(j) j ∈ [n]
µ ≥ 1 + jf(j)− f(j + 1) j ∈ [n− 1]
µ ≥ 1 + (j − 1)f(j) j ∈ [n] .
We conclude with a little of cosmetics: the first and third set
of inequalities run over j ∈ [n], while the second one has
j ∈ [n − 1]. Observe that the first and the third condition
evaluated at j = 1 read both as µ ≥ 1. This condition is
implied by the last set of condition with j = 2, indeed it
reads as µ ≥ 1+ f(2) ≥ 1 since we assumed f non negative.
Thus the first and third conditions can be reduced to j ∈ [2, n].
Shifting the indices down by one, we get
W ? =min
µ∈R
µ
s.t. µ ≥ (j + 1)f(j + 1) j ∈ [n− 1]
µ ≥ 1 + jf(j)− f(j + 1) j ∈ [n− 1]
µ ≥ 1 + jf(j + 1) j ∈ [n− 1] ,
from which we get the analytic expression in (17), i.e.
W ? = 1+max
j∈[n−1]
{(j+1)f(j+1)−1, jf(j)−f(j+1), jf(j+1)} .
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
Proof. Thanks to Theorem 2, the value W ? and consequently
the price of anarchy can be computed as
W ? = max
j∈[n−1]
{(j+1)f(j+1), 1+jf(j)−f(j+1), 1+jf(j+1)} .
We will show that when f is non-increasing, fewer constraints
are required, producing exactly (18).
First observe that f being non-increasing implies (j +
1)f(j + 1) = f(j + 1) + jf(j + 1) ≤ f(1) + jf(j + 1) =
1+ jf(j +1), so that the first set of conditions is implied by
the third. Hence
W ? = 1 + max
j∈[n−1]
{jf(j)− f(j + 1), jf(j + 1)} .
We now verify that the first set of remaining conditions implies
all the conditions in the second set, but not the last one:
µ ≥ 1+jf(j)−f(j+1) ≥ 1+jf(j)−f(j) = 1+(j−1)f(j) ,
∀j ∈ [n− 1] that is, all conditions µ ≥ jf(j+1) are satisfied
for j ∈ [n − 2]. Thus, it suffices to require µ − 1 ≥ jf(j) −
f(j + 1) and µ − 1 ≥ (n − 1)f(n) for all j ∈ [n] and the
result in (18) follows.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof. The proof is a specialization of the general result obtain
in Theorem 3. We divide the study in the same three cases used
for the proof of Theorem 2.
In case C1, the constraints read as
w(b)− λb ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ λ ≥ w(b)
b
,
the most constraining of which is given for b = n as w(b) is
convex. Thus it must be
λ ≥ w(n)
n
.
In case C2, the constraints read as
λaf(a) ≤ µw(a) ⇐⇒ µ ≥ λa f(a)
w(a)
.
In case C3, the constraints read as
µ ≥ w(b+ x)
w(a+ x)
+ λ
[
a
f(a+ x)
w(a+ x)
− bf(a+ x+ 1)
w(a+ x)
]
.
In order to conclude, we will show that the constraints obtained
from C1 and C2 imply all the conditions stemming from C3.
To do so observe that
w(b+ x)
w(a+ x)
+ λ
[
a
f(a+ x)
w(a+ x)
− bf(a+ x+ 1)
w(a+ x)
]
=
1
w(a+ x)
[
w(b+ x)− λbw(a+ x+ 1)f(a+ x+ 1)
+ λaf(a+ x)
]
≤ 1
w(a+ x)
[
λ(b+ x)− λb · f(1)w(1) + λaf(a+ x)
]
=
1
w(a+ x)
[xλ+ λaf(a+ x)] ≤ λ(a+ x) f(a+ x)
w(a+ x)
From first to second line is rearrangement. From second to
third is due to f(a + x + 1) ≥ f(1) = 1 and to w(b + x) ≤
w(n)
n (b+x) ≤ λ(b+x) where the first inequality holds because
of convexity of w and the second inequality follows from C1
i.e. from λ ≥ w(n)n . From third to fourth is rearrangement.
The last inequality follows from 1 = f(1) ≤ f(a+ x).
The previous series of inequalities have demonstrated that
if µ ≥ λaf(a)/w(a) as required by condition C2, and if λ ≥
w(n)
n as required by condition C1, then µ ≥ λ(a+x) f(a+x)w(a+x) ≥
w(b+x)
w(a+x) + λ
[
a f(a+x)w(a+x) − b f(a+x+1)w(a+x)
]
i.e. conditions C3 are all
satisfied.
It follows that W ? and consequently the price of anarchy
is easily obtained as
W ? = min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t. µ ≥ λj f(j)
w(j)
∀j ∈ [n]
λ ≥ w(n)
n
.
(23)
The solution is given by λ? = w(n)n , µ
? =
λ?maxj∈[n] jf(j)/w(j), which gives a price of anarchy of
PoA(f, w, n) =
n
w(n)
1
maxj∈[n] j · f(j)w(j)
.
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The optimality of fSV follows from the fact that maxj∈[n] j ·
fSV(j)/w(j) = 1 is the smallest achievable value.
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